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Seldom do modern lawyers realize the ancient origin
of many of the laws with which they deal from day to day.
Particularly is this true in the field of property law. Rules
born as far back as Merry England sometimes thrive in
Ohio today. Of course, concepts which are old are not
necessarily bad. Their very age may demonstrate a rugged
vitality and merit which enables them to stand well the test
of time. But an aged concept may remain in force be-
cause it has never been questioned, having always been im-
bued with a certain reverence and awe. Like heirlooms,
frequently lacking in inherent value but depending, for
preservation, on sentiment alone, a particular concept may
have been handed down from generation to generation
with that peculiar veneration accorded cherished and in-
timate possessions.
Should not Ohio examine its property law at this time
in order to weed out and correct existing deficiencies of
this sort? No better starting point for such an examina-
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tion could be found than the Uniform Property Act,' un-
der the joint authorship and bearing the joint approval of
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (which has successfully sponsored so much
other uniform legislation) and of the American Law In-
stitute (which seldom adopts this method of obtaining ad-
vancement in the law). Drafted by recognized experts in
the field of property law, it seeks to abolish anachronisms
in the law and "to assimilate interests in real and personal
property to each other, to simplify their creation and trans-
fer and to protect the owners of present and future in-
terests, and to make uniform the law with reference there-
to.
'2
Should Ohio consider the adoption of the entire Act?
There are some who are prone to answer this question
in the negative.3 There may be valid reasons for a dif-
ferent answer, however.
At the outset it is clear that piecemeal legislation is
rarely enough to keep non-statutory law abreast of cur-
rent customs and thought, for it does not view the picture
broadly enough. In the fields of property law the Uni-
form Property Act takes this broad view. It suggests po-
tential deficiencies in existing law. Moreover, its pro-
visions are clear and simple. It codifies the various ad-
vantages appearing in the reforms already attempted in
the several states. In sum, the Act presents sound, sub-
stantive principles and concise terminology, wherever re-
vision of existing law is found necessary.
In addition, there are benefits to be gleaned from uni-
formity amongst the states. ,An out-of-state lawyer who
is preparing a will or a deed concerning Ohio land need
1 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS (1938), p. 262.
2 Ibid. This is the stated purpose of the Act.
3 See White, Uniform Laws of Real Property (1938) 12 ,CIN. L. REv. 549.
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only refer to a manual to determine that Ohio has the
Uniform Property Act, and in turn refer to his copy of
that Act, in order to determine the exact status of Ohio in
regard to the estates permissible in things other than land,'
the ability to alienate future interests' and to subject them
to claims of creditors,' the ability to convey successfully
in a combination of grantees which includes the grantor or
grantors7 fees tail,8 the construction of "die without
issue,"' the destructibility of contingent interests," the im-
plication of cross remainders," the damages recoverable
for waste," the Doctrine of Worthier Title," the matters
discussed in this article and other matters of interest to
such a lawyer. No longer need he consume bothersome
hours in locating Ohio statutes or cases because the Act
has been drafted with a view toward clarity upon first
4 Section 3 assimilates land and personalty by providing that any interest
which can be created in land can also be created in personalty. The Section
is purely an enabling act and does not prescribe new or changed old methods
of creation, however.
Section 7 makes all future interests alienable.
' Section 8 subjects all future interests to the claims of creditors.
'Section 19 makes this possible, in various combinations.
' Section 10 abolishes fees tail. Wherever language appropriate thereto is
used, a fee simple is created in the person who would have taken the fee tail.
' Section 11 establishes a rule of construction under which these words are
interpreted to mean a definite rather than an indefinite failure of issue unless
a contrary intention is manifested. A substitutional construction, in so far as
this may relate to the death of the creator of the instrument, is similarly
precluded.
" Section 16 makes contingent interests indestructible.
"Section 17 establishes a rule of construction favoring the implication of
cross remainders. For instance, if a tenancy in common were granted to A
and B for life, and upon the death of the survivor, to C in fee, the survivor
would receive a life estate in the share held by the deceased, by implication.
'Section 21 eliminates the possibility of multiple damages for waste and
prevents forfeiture therefor. Recovery for waste is limited to compensatory
damages.
"Sections 14 and 15 abolish the Doctrine of Worthier Title in respect to
both wills and deeds. A will or conveyance to the testator's or grantor's heirs
effectively creates an estate in the heirs, under the rule of law enunciated in
these Sections.
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reading. In addition, Ohio courts may derive some bene-
fit from interpretations already placed upon the Act by
other states, such as Nebraska,' which have already
adopted it, although complete unanimity of interpretation
may not, of course, be obtainable.
It is apparent that this article could not deal properly
with each single topic. Therefore, attention will be con-
fined to two ancient rules which the Act seeks to abolish
as anachronisms. The first of these is the rule in Wild's
Case which is a rule of construction dealing with a limita-
tion to a person and "his children" or "his issue." The
second is the Rule in Shelley's Case which is a rule of law
dealing with limitations such as "to A for life and then to
his heirs." Such limitations are all too frequently made
without adequate appreciation of the actual meaning of
the words used or of the legal consequences thereof.
THE RULE IN WILD'S CASE
Generally speaking, the Rule in Wild's Case as applied
in the United States results in a fee tail in the parent if
there were no children in existence at the date the instru-
14 Nebraska, Laws of 1941, Chapter 153. To date, Nebraska is the only
state which has adopted the Uniform Property Act in its entirely. For other
discussions of the Act, see: English, The Uniform Property Act in Pewnsyl-
vani a (1941) 46 DicINsoN L. REv. 26; Ginsburg, Uniform Property Act,
Nebraska (1939), 18 NEB. L. B. 132; Myerberg, Maryland Examnes the
Uniform Property Act (1,39) 4 MD. L. REV. 1; Sims, The Desirability of
Statutory Restatement of Alabama Property Law (1940) 1 Ai.LA. LAWYER 75.
House Bill 184, as passed by the House of Representatives of Alabama, con-
tains both the Uniform Property Act (described in this article) and the
Uniform Estates Act, as modified by Henry Upson Sims of the Alabama Bar.
The latter Act, prepared and approved by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws (but this time acting alone), seeks to codify
and clarify current concepts of estates. The Uniform Estates Act can be
enacted either separately or concurrently with the Uniform Property Act,
for it has been drafted with the latter possibility in mind. For its pro-
visions, see -LkMDnRooK, op. cit. supra, n. 5, p. 272. See, also, Note, The
Uniform Property Act (1939) 52 HARv. L. REv. 993.
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ment went into effect, but in a fee simple held concurrently
by the parent and his children if the opposite were the
case.
i
This doctrine originally appeared in dicta as far back
as 1599. !Fild's Case " involved a devise of land to A for
life, remainder to B and the heirs of his body, remainder
to "V and wife, and after their decease to their children."
C and D, children of [V and wife, were alive when the will
was executed. Subsequently, the following events hap-
pened in succession: the testator, A, B (without issue), W
and wife died; C had a child, E, and then died. The court
was asked to determine Es share in the testator's estate.
Of course, E would take nothing from the will if anything
less than a fee tail had been created in TV and wife. The
court held that to be the case, for TV and wife received only
a joint life estate, with a remainder for life in their chil-
dren.
Because a will was involved, the technical words "heirs
of the body" were not required in order to create a fee
tail, although the court recognized these words to be neces-
sary for that result had an inter vivos conveyance been
before it. No intention to vary the ordinary construction
of the words used had been manifested by the testator, said
the court, while observing ". . . if A devises his lands to B
and to his children or issues, and he hath not any issue at
the time of the devise, that the same is an estate tail;...
but if a man devises land to A and to his children or issue,
and they then have issue of their bodies, there his express
intent may take effect ... and they shall have but a joint
estate for life."
The court based its holding on its belief that an im-
mediate gift was not required by the unrebutted language
I See, 2 SIMES, FUTU-E INTERESTS (1936), Sec. 409; Casner, The Rule in
lWild's Case (1940), 7 U. of CHic. L. REv. 438, at 446, 4-56.
6 Co. Rep. 16b, 77 Eng. Rep. 277 (1599).
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in the will, which lent itself primarily to a life estate and
remainder construction. In its first dictum, or "resolu-
tion," however, the court discerned a desire to benefit the
children, while noting that the gift purported to be imme-
diate in nature. Since no children were in being at the
execution of the will (under the facts supposed), the best
way to effectuate the testator's intention, in the court's
opinion, was to treat the word "children" as a word of
limitation and to grant B a fee tail.
Similarly, in the second "resolution," the court desired
to give effect to the testator's probable intention, but the
ordinary machinery of the common law could achieve this
aim. Thus, A and his children were said to have but a
joint estate for life, for words of inheritance were lacking,
and there was no apparent intention to create a fee. (At
this period the common law favored joint tenancies over
tenancies in common.)" Moreover, since children were in
esse when the will was made, a construction of the word
"children" as a word of purchase accorded with the testa-
tor's obvious desire to transmit an immediate gift to the
children, in the opinion of the court.
These dicta were carried over into actual holdings in
England during the ensuing years. 8 In the United States
today, the Rule in Wild's Case is a rule of construction
and not a rule of law; each of the two presumptions is sub-
ject to rebuttal by the manifestation of a contrary inten-
tion.1
See Moushand v. Rodetzky, 5 Ohio N. P. 256, 7 Ohio D. 225 (1898);
Hinkson v. Adkins, 25 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 16 (1924); 2 SimEs, FUTuME IN-
TERESTS (1936), Sec. 409; 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3rd Ed. 1939),
Sec. 421.
See SIzms, op. cit. supra n. 17, Sec. 401, and cases cited.
" RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY, Sec. 283; SIMEs, op. cit. supra n 17, Sec. 403;
Casner, The Rule in Wild's Case (1940) 7 U. OF Crnc. L. REv. 438, at pp. 446
and 456.
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Both resolutions in Wild's Case would appear to be law
in Ohio today, generally speaking.
20
Soteldo v. Clement states both resolutions but con-
fines its holding to the second. There was a devise of land
in trust for "A and her children," there being two children
who were living at the testator's death; however, it is not
clear from the opinion whether they were living when the
will was executed. The holding was that A and the two
children took to the exclusion of all after-born children.
The court employed what it thought to be an alternative
form of stating the second resolution, when it stated the
rule of class gifts which requires the class to close its
ranks to after-born members at the time of the distribu-
tion of the gift.
Hoover v. Gardner 22 cites Soteldo v. Clement, supra, in
applying the first resolution, although without express
mention of Wild's Case. Here, the devise of land was to
A for life, then to B and C "and their children," but if
either die without issue, to the survivor. No children of
B or C were in esse either at the time of the making of the
will or at the time of the death of the testator. The court
held that fees tail were created in remainder in B and C.
A prior decision 2" in this same case stated that the word
"children" was used here as a word of limitation. It should
be noted, however, that there was no extensive discussion
in either opinion as contained in the published reports.
Other cases would seem to bear these cases out,24 al-
See 41 OHIo JuIISPruENCE (1M35), Sec. 676.
,, 11 Ohio Dec. (Rep.) 802, 29 W. L. Bull. 384 (1893).
-2 Ohio L. Abs. 135 (1924).
=I Ohio L. Abs. 770 (1923).
fWith regard to the first resolution, see:
Soteldo v. Clement, supra, n. 21; Long v. Olinger, 16 Ohio L. Abs. 182
(1933). But see: 'Moushand v. Rodetzky, supra, n. 17 (garbled opinion;
where will gave realty and personalty to wife for life, then to A, and to her
children and grandchildren or their legal representatives, and where there were
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though there is no authoritative holding on the subject in
the Ohio Supreme Court. Harkness v. Corning' handed
down in 1873, comes about as close as any case in the
Supreme Court to touching on the point. There, the de-
vise was to A for life, then to B "and her issue," with a
habendum clause, "to have and to hold to B and her issue
and their heirs." A gift over to C was limited on B's
dying before 21 without issue then living. A's life estate
having been disposed of because A (the testator's wife)
failed to elect to take under the will, B reached 21 and then
died without issue. The question before the court was
whether B's husband was entitled to curtesy, and the
court held that he was, since B had gotten a fee tail.
Counsel expressly argued the Rule in Wild's Case, stress-
ing the fact that there were no children in esse at any time.
The court expressly held that B got a fee tail, not a life
estate, expressly construed the word "issue" as a word of
limitation and not of purchase, expressly announced its
satisfaction that such was the rule upon "authority," but
expressly refused to consider the case as if the word "chil-
dren" had been used instead of "issue."
The court did not refer specifically to the wording used
in the habendum clause, but instead seemed inclined to rest
its conclusion squarely upon an interpretation of the word
no children in esse either at the date of the will or at the death of the testator,
held: fee simple vested in A. Court cited Wild's Case, but stated only that the
word "children" was usually a word of purchase, but here the additional refer-
ence to the grandchildren showed an intention to make it synonymous with the
word "heirs", and thus it was a word of limitation. Of course, if the latter
ground was the chief basis of the decision, it would indicate that the rule of
construction had been rebutted by a contrary intent, but, unfortunately, the
tenor of the rest of the opinion does not support that conclusion. Consequently,
it is difficult to explain or to classify this case).
With regard to the second resolution, see: Clark v. Clark, 13 Ohio
App. 164, 31 Ohio C. C. (n. s.) 472 (19-20) ; Moushand v. Rodetzky, supra, n.
17; Sheets v. Mouat, 5 Ohio N. P. (n. s.) 22, 18 Ohio Dec. 121 (1907);
Hinkson v. Adkins, supra, n. 17.
224 Ohio St. 416 (1873).
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"issue" as "heirs of the body," entirely apart from any
consideration of the Rule in Wild's Case and of the pres-
ence or absence of children. Wild's Case was not cited in
the opinion.
None of the cases cited in Harkness v. Corning directly
involve a gift "to .4 and his issue." The closest they come
is Nightingale v. Burrell," which applies the first resolu-
tion where the devise is to "A and her children," and which
states:
"A devise to one and his children, he having no children at the
time, is equivalent to a devise to him and his issue, and creates an
estate tail."
27
It must be concluded that the cases cited, at least, do
not support the court's holding. To be sure, the two texts 28
are properly cited; however, they are both of English ex-
traction and bear no supporting American authorities on
this point. Jarman, the better reasoned of these, is of the
opinion that a gift to "A and his issue" should be treated
differently from one to "A and his children," because of
the very principle enunciated in Wild's Case, namely, the
desire to fulfill the testator's intention to benefit A's issue
under all conceivable circumstances. The word "issue"
is nonzen collectivifn, and normally cannot be limited to
descendants of any given period, unless the context indi-
cates a contrary intention. Only by giving A a fee tail
can all the issue be benefited, says Jarman, and this whether
or not issue are ini esse at any given time.
But cases, such as Harkness v. Corning, where no chil-
dren or issue appear at any time, are scarcely a fair test
of that principle. A fee tail would be the result, whether
'15 Pickering 104 (Mass., 1833).
71bid, at 119.
'HAWKINS, CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS (Amer. Ed. 1872), 189; 2 JARMAN,
WILLS (1st Amer. Ed. 1845), 328.
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Jarman's reasoning or the first resolution in Wild's Case
is followed."
Although the above discussion suffices in so far as the
general application of the resolutions in Ohio Law is con-
cerned, nevertheless certain detailed quirks must be sup-
plied in order to obtain the complete picture. As may be
expected, Ohio law does not furnish all the answers, al-
though it does pretty well. Thus, both resolutions seem
to apply to both deeds" and wills,3 although this would
appear to be at variance with most of the cases in other
jurisdictions in respect to the first resolution." Long v.
Olinger," which applies the first resolution to a deed, is an
interesting case. Realty was conveyed by A "to B, and the
children of his body begotten, and their heirs and assigns
forever." B, at the time, had been married for fifteen
years and had had no children. In this suit, B sought to
quiet his title, contending that he had received a full fee
simple to the entire tract because the intent was to grant
him and his children a fee simple as one class. Inasmuch
as the class was limited to himself alone at the period of
' Harkness v. Corning has never been cited as denying the application of
the second resolution where the gift is to A and his issue, and issue are in
esse. Moreover, several more recent cases in the lower courts, which them-
selves applied the second resolution to gifts to "children", expressed dicta to
the effect that the Rule will apply where the gift is to "issue". Soteldo v.
Clement, spra, n. 21; Hinkson v. Adkins, supra, n. 17.
'In respect to the first resolution, see: Long v. Olinger, supra, n. 24.
In respect to the second resolution: Sheets v. Mouat, supra, n. 24. See, also:
Soteldo v. Clement, supra, n. 21; Moushand v. Rodetzky, supra, n. 17.
'See Ohio cases cited on the Rule in Wild's Case in this article other
than those set forth in n. 30.
"See SimES, FuTuRE INTERESTS (1936), Sec. 406. Tire Restatement of
Property, Sec. 283-b, does not follow the first resolution. It states the rule as
giving a life estate to the parent and a remainder to the children as a class
wherever there were no children at the date the instrument went into effect.
According to Comment (a), the rule has always been as stated in respect to all
deeds and to wills involving personalty, and consistency demands that it apply
to devises, also.
Supra, n. 24.
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distribution, the entire fee vested in him, ran the argument.
On the other hand, the defendants (who were the other
children of A) apparently contended that B received no
more than a fee tail. The lower court held that B took a
fee tail. On appeal, the upper court entered into a pro-
tracted discussion of both of the resolutions in Wild's Case,
while ruling against B on the sole issue before it (whether
B had a fee simple or not), and while expressly refusing
to decide just what estate B had received by the grant. The
opinion clearly implied, however, that the court was in-
clined to uphold the lower court here also, not only because
of what it thought to be the precedent set by other author-
ities, but also because of the peculiar circumstances of the
case. Thus, by departing from the usual terminology here,
.4 meant to accomplish something, and that was to benefit
B's children. The attempt would fail if B's contention
were allowed, so B received a fee tail.
This case is interesting for several reasons: seldom is
such language used in an immediate grant in an inter
vivos conveyance; authorities involving devises were cited
with regard to deeds without comment as to possible dif-
ferences.
None of the Ohio cases apply the Rule to personalty.
In so far as the first resolution is concerned, this is quite
natural, for estates tail in personalty are impossible in
Ohio.3" Thus, if the first resolution were to operate, the
fee tail in the personalty would probably be converted into
a full fee simple in the parent. This would defeat the
whole purpose of the first resolution because the entire con-
trol over the personalty would then be in the hands of the
parent, and the children would have no assurance of ulti-
mately sharing in the gift. For this reason, the cases in
' Fees tail are not possible in personalty in Ohio. King v. Beck, 12 Ohio
390 (1843), reversed on other grounds in 15 Ohio 559 (1846).
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other jurisdictions hold the first resolution inapplicable to
personalty,"5 although the second resolution continues in
full force and effect. 8 The reasons underlying the second
resolution apply equally well to realty or personalty.
Several cases " suggest that the date the instrument
goes into effect is the test date for the operation of the
Rule rather than the date of its execution, although these
are by no means holdings on the subject. This is at vari-
ance with the indications in Wild's Case as well as the sub-
sequent English decision. 8 However, if the indications in
the Ohio cases are correct, the weight of authority in other
American jurisdictions has been followed.39 Of course, it
is apparent that the same test must be adopted in respect
to both resolutions in order to avoid conflict.
Several cases apply the rule where the gift is post-
See n. 32, supra.
" See SImEs, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936), Sec. 408.
Soteldo v. Clement, supra, n. 21; Moushand v. Rodetzky, supra, n. 17.
'Seale v. Barter, 2 Bos. & P. 485, 126 Eng. Rep. 1398 (1801), in which
the court, in construing a devise to "J.S. and his children lawfully begotten"
where J.S. had no children at the execution of the will but had children at
the testator's death, held that J.S. received a fee tail, expressly refusing to
consider the problem as if J.S. had had children at the time of the devise.
But JARIVAN, op. cit. supra, n. 28, at 308, argues against the English test
as frequently frustrating the whole purpose of the Rule. For instance, where
a child is alive at the execution of the will but dies prior to the testator's
death, the parent may take a fee simple to the entire estate to the exclusion
of afterborn children, if the parent and the children are regarded as one
indivisible class and there is no lapse statute applying to class gifts. For
support Jarman cites Buffar v. Bradford, 2 Atk. 220, 26 Eng. Rep. 537 (1741),
the reverse case, where there were no children in esse when the will was
executed, but some were born prior to the testator's death. A predeceased the
testator. Against the argument that the entire devise ("to A and the children
born of her body") lapsed, the court held in favor of the children. However,
Buffar v. Bradford is explained in Byng v. Byng, 10 H.L. Cas. 171, 11 Eng.
Rep. 991 (1862) (which is not a decision on the point under discussion) on
the ground that the normal presumptions in Wild's Case were rebutted by
the manifestation of the testator's intention that the devisees should be deter-
mined as of the time at which the estate vested in possession.
'See SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936), Sec. 404.
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poned,4 ° as well as where it is immediate,41 although it
should be noted that no case actually applies the second
resolution to a postponed gift. Here it might be said that
neither the doctrine as enunciated in Wild's Case nor the
reasons underlying that doctrine would seem to permit
its application where the gift in question is postponed be-
cause, in distinguishing the holding in Wild's Case from
the dicta, chief stress was laid upon the immediate nature
of the gift. Where the gift is not immediate the children
can best benefit by a remainder construction for not only
will all children, whenever born, share in the gift in accord-
ance with the well-known rule of distribution relating to
class gifts, but also these children need not undergo the
possibility that their parent might dispose of his share of
the tenancy in common rather than passing it along to
them.
The above is all the Ohio law discovered on this sub-
"Harkness v. Corning, supra, n. 30; Hoover v. Gardner, supra, n. 27 and
23. Cf. Ufferman, Exrx. v. Fry, 20 Ohio 0. 39 (C.P., 1938), where the
testator gave property to his wife for life, then to "be divided between my
children, A4, B, C and D, share and share alike, and to their children, if any,
in like manner." After the testator's death, the executrix sought and obtained
a declaratory judgment, which construed the will so as to give an estate to the
children's children only if their parent had died before the period of distribu-
tion. No mention of the Rule in Wild's case, or the presence or absence of
children, was made in the opinion. The court interpreted the words "and
to their children" as "or to their children" because the prime objects of the
testator's bounty were thought to be his own children. The grandchildren
could not properly be regarded as competing with their parents, observed the
court.
Moushand v. Rod etzky, cited and discussed at some length in n. 24, suPra,
also involved a postponed gift.
'See Ohio cases cited on the Rule in Wild's Case in this article other
than those set forth in n. 40, supra.
'Soteldo v. Clement, supra n. 21, demonstrated the applicability of the
resolutions to equitable as well as legal estates. Clark v. Clark, supra n. 24,
Hoo'er v. Gardner, sirpra n. 22, and n. 23, and Hinkson v. Adkins, supra n. 17,
demonstrates the fact that both resolutions operate where the gift is to several
parents and their children under one disposition (e. g., "to A, B and C and
their children").
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ject. That present-day Ohio law bears a very close re-
semblance in this respect to rules handed down hundreds
of years ago in a different country with different political,
social and economic customs can easily be shown. We may
well stop and ask ourselves at this time: Should all this be
changed? Obviously not if the results obtained from these
rules are in harmony with the times today and present the
nearest possible approach to the probable intention of the
person creating the estate, had he foreseen the exact cir-
cumstances which eventuated.
Today, however, most states are moving away from
estates tail, even in respect to realty.4" By far the greater
number of states have abolished fees tail entirely." Why
should a rule of construction which frequently leads to
their creation continue in existence? Is not such a rule
highly artificial? To follow the first resolution today,
therefore, would seem to involve a complete disregard of
the sentiment prevailing against fees tail.
What did the person who created the estate actually
intend, in all probability? Apart from the crystallization
of artificial concepts down through the years, it would
seem that he was anxious about two things, above all, and
these two things were more or less related; first, that all
children, whenever born, should share in the gift, and
second, that the gifts to the parent and to the children
should be successive, and not concurrent.
Applying the first consideration to the first resolution,
it would seem that Ohio law solves the basic problem in
this respect in so far as realty is concerned." The aliena-
'RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1st. ed. 1936), Chap. 5, Introductory Note.
"Ibid. All but six states have abolished them in one form or another.
These six treat them for most purposes as a fee simple.
'Section 10512-8 of the Ohio General Code (Page, 1938) provides, in
respect to fees tail:
"... All estates given in tail, by deed or will, in lands or tenements lying
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tion of the fee tail by the parent (the first donee fee tail)
has no effect on the interest of the issue, and all children,
whenever born, will share in the fee simple transmitted to
them by Section 10512-8 if they survive their parent's
death. 7 However, the application of the first resolution
with a fee tail resulting, rather than a life estate and re-
mainder, has certain incidental effects which require
specific mention: instead of being liable for waste and sub-
ject to forfeiture therefor as he would be if he were merely
a life tenant, the parent as a tenant in tail completely
escapes these responsibilities ;4' his spouse is entitled to the
modern equivalent of dower or curtesy, because an estate
of inheritance has been given ;49 and the issue of the tenant
in tail must survive him or the estate will revert to the
original grantor or to the testator, as the case may be."
Moreover, the desire to benefit the children may go com-
pletely amiss in the case of personalty; a fee tail in the
parent would be converted into a fee simple absolute, 1
which would be fully alienable by the parent.
Nor does the motive to benefit all children, whenever
born, thrive under an application of the second resolution.
Where the gift is immediate, the rules of distribution in
relation to class gifts exclude those born after the period
within this state, shall be and remain an absolute estate in fee simple to the
issue of the first donee in tail . . ."
' Pollock v. Speidel, 17 Ohio St. 439 (1867); Hoover v. Gardner, supra,
n. 28. See Yoder v. Ford, 10 Ohio Dec. (Rep.) 675, 23 W.L. Bull. 54 (1889).
"T his follows from Section 10512-8, quoted above, n. 45.
'"Hall v. Rohr, 10 Ohio Dec. (Rep.) 690, 23 W. L. Bull. 121 (1890).
See Pollock v. Speidel, supra, n. 46; Williams v. Hailer, 13 Ohio N.P. (n.s.)
329, 27 0. Dec. 843 (1912) ; (good comparison, here, of respective character-
istics of life estate and fee tail).
H arkness v. Corning, supra, n. 2.5; Broadstone v. Brown, 24 Ohio St.
430 (1873). See Pollock v. Speidel, supra, n. 46; Williams v. Hailer, supra,
n. 48.
' Evangelical Lutheran Confession v. Sheffield, 90 Ohio St. 467, 108 N.E.
1119 (1914).
"See n. 34, supra.
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of distribution, i. e., either the death of the testator or the
delivery of the deed. True, where the gift is postponed
this may not be correct because the second resolution
merely determines that the parent and the children take a
concurrent estate in fee, while the rules of class gifts hold
the class open until distribution. Even here, however,
some after-born children may be shut out. Of course,
this discussion of the application of the second resolution
to postponed gifts is speculative because, as noted above,"2
no cases have arisen on this point in Ohio as yet.
The second resolution, as mentioned above, also seems
artificial and not the best solution to the problem because
it puts the parent and the child on an equal plane. How
frequently can it be said that that is the intended result,
rather than one affording the parent possession and con-
trol during his life, he to be succeeded in fee by his chil-
dren? Of course, no one can be certain, but it would ap-
pear that any presumption should lean in the latter direc-
tion, being subject of course to rebuttal by a manifestation
of a contrary intent.
To some extent, at least, a concurrent construction un-
der the second resolution also defeats the intention to bene-
fit the children. Where the parent receives a parcel of the
entire estate as a tenant in common in fee simple, his par-
cel is fully alienable and may never find its way into the
hands of his children, as the testator probably intended.
Finally, the doctrine of Wild's Case seems completely
artificial and unreal because of its very lack of uniformity.
The same simple words "to A and his children," are con-
strued to mean all sorts of different things, in accordance
with the circumstances subsequently found to be present.
How much more simple and natural it would seem to in-
terpret these words in one way in every instance. Not only
See discussion immediately following n. 37, supra.
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would this probably accord more closely to actual inten-
tion, but also an increased certainty of result would be
obtained therefrom both in respect to draftsmanship 3 and
in respect to the avoidance of litigation.
Section 13 of the Uniform Property Act " enunciates
a rule of construction which changes both resolutions in
Vild's Case. In the absence of contrary intention, Section
13 creates a life estate in the parent, with a remainder in
fee to his children, when the gift or grant reads "to A and
his children" or "to A and his issue", and this whether
deed, will, realty or personalty is involved, whether the gift
is immediate or postponed, legal or equitable, and irrespec-
tive of the presence or absence of children at any time. By
so doing, it seeks to bring the law up to date. Time-worn
fees tail are avoided. All children, whenever born, are
benefited. Successive rather than concurrent estates are
created. Simplicity and uniformity are achieved.
This is meritorious legislation, worthy of enactment in
Ohio.
' It is, of course, patently clear that no skilled draftsman would employ
t%<se words. Instead, he would spell out the precise result intended, thereby
avoidin- all inherent uncertainties and preventing all potential litigation. But
query -whether all of the instruments in the many cases on this point were
drafted by layman. For the all too numerous cases in other jurisdictions, see
Casner, op. cit. supra, n. 19.
4 Section 13 provides:
"When an otherwise effective conveyance of property is made in favor of
a person and his 'children,' or in favor of a person and his 'issue,' or by
other words of similar import designating the person and the descendants of
the person, whether the conveyance is immediate or postponed, the conveyance
creates a life interest in the person designated and a remainder in his designated
descendants, unless an intent to create other interests is effectively manifested."
Section 1, containing definitions of "property," "future interest," "conveyance,"
"otherwise effective conveyance" and "effectively manifested," defines "property"
to include both real and personal, legal and equitable property, and "convey-
ance" to include both wills and deeds. Some appropriate adjustment should
be made of course, if Section 13 is adopted without the remainder of the Act.
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THE RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE
Another well-known anachronism in property law is the
Rule ;n Shelly's Case. Several Ohio cases " have quoted
Kent's statement of this rule as follows :"
"When a person takes an estate of freehold, legally or equitably,
under a deed, will, or other writing, and in the same instrument there
is a limitation by way of remainder, either with or without the inter-
position of another estate, of an interest of the same legal or equit-
able quality, to his heirs, or heirs of his body, as a class of persons
to take in succession, from generation to generation, the limitation
to the heirs entitles the ancestor to the whole estate."
This statement could be more precise, but it will serve
present purposes. This Rule converted a gift "to A for
life, and then to his heirs" into a life estate in A, followed
by a remainder in fee to A and his heirs." The word
"heirs" was changed thereby from a word of purchase to
a word of limitation. In addition, the doctrine of merger 8
operated wherever possible, so that A ultimately received
a fee simple absolute, which was freely alienable.
This Rule, originating in England long before the
case " which gave it its name in 1581,"° was a product of
" Continental Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Skinner, 4 Ohio C. C. 526, 2 -Ohio C. D.
688 (1890), aff'd without opinion in 30 W. L. Bull. 307 (1893); Gordon v.
Bartlett, 28 Ohio L. Abs. 161 (1938), motion to certify overruled, March 8,
1939; Davis v. Saunders, 8 Ohio N. P. 161, 11 Ohio D. 259 (1900).
Other statements of the rule in Ohio can be found in: McFeeley's Lessee
v. Moore's Heirs, 5 Ohio 465 (1832) (a leading case: its statement of the rule
quoted in many subsequent cases) ; King v. Beck, .12 Ohio 390 (1843).
4 KENT'S COMMENTARMS.
' For additional discussion of this entire topic, see 36 OHIo JURiSPRUDENCE
(1st Ed. 1934), "Shelley's Case, Rule In."
'See: Brockschmidt v. Archer, 64 Ohio St. 502, 60 N.E. 623 (1901);
Kepler v. Reeves, 7 -Ohio Dec. (Rep.) 34, 1 W. L. Bull. 58 (1876); Hess v.
Lakin, 7 Ohio N.P. 314, 7 Ohio D. 300 (1898). But see: Kirby v. Brown-
lee, 13 Ohio C.C. 86, 7 Ohio C.D. 460 (1894), where it was suggested that
the operation of the Rule would result in a fee simple in the ancestor which
would swallow up an intervening life estate.
' 1 Coke 93b, 76 Eng. Rep. 206 (1581).
RESTATEmENT, PROPERTY (1st. ed. 1940), Sec. 312, Comment (a), traces
the Rule as far back as 1324 A.D.
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the feudal system of tenure in land. Incidents of tenure,
such as wardships, reliefs and marriage fees, were lost to
the overlord if land passed by purchase rather than by
descent. Therefore, the landed aristocracy, who were in
power, favored the latter method of transfer. The Rule in
Shelley's Case, which looked toward transfer by descent,
was the natural result.
Although often spoken of as a rule of law,6 defeating
intent, and therefore not subject to rebuttal from an exam-
ination of the instrument as a whole, this statement should
not stand alone. There was always a preliminary problem
of construction to determine whether the word "heirs" was
used in the technical, medieval sense as nornen collectivum,
meaning an indefinite, inheritable line of succession, 2
rather than as a word of description referring to individ-
uals who would inherit from the ancestor if he were to die
intestate and who were intended to form a new root of
descent." In Ohio, the presumption was in favor of the
former interpretation,"4 but if the latter were discovered
from the context and surrounding circumstances the Rule
had no application." However, if all the requirements of
the Rule were found to be present, it was ruthlessly applied
King v. Beck, 15 Ohio 559 (1846); Brockschmidt v. Archer, supra, n.
58; Neff v. Abert, .9 Ohio App. 286 (1918); and many others.
Cf. Kiersted v. Smith, 8 Ohio N.P. 378, 10 Ohio D. 279 (1900); Re
Dennis, 30 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 118 (1928).
'King v. Beck, supra, n. 61; Brockschmidt v. Archer, supra, n. 58;
Continental fut. Life Ins. Co. v. Skinner, supra, n. 55; Halley v. Hengstler,
3 Ohio C.C. (n.s.) 161, 23 Ohio C.C. 504 (1902), aff'd witho opxniol in
70 Ohio St. 452, 72 N.E. 1158 (1903). See, also, 36 OHio JURISPRUDENCE (1st
ed. 1934), "Shelley's Case, Rule In," Sec. 7.
Turley v. Turley, 11 Ohio St. 173 (1860) ; Watson v. Watson, 34 Ohio
App. 311, 171 N. E. 257 (192.9). In addition, see cases cited, supra, n. 62.
See also, 36 OIO JURISPRUDENCE (1st ed. 1934), "Shelley's Case, Rule In,"
Sec. 13, 15, 16.
Brockschmidt v. Archer, supra, n. 58; Halley v. Hengstler, supra, n. 62.
See, also, King v. Beck, supra, n. 61.
' See cases cited in n. 63, supra.
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despite the most vigorous of protestations on the part of
the grantor or testator in the rest of the instrument."6
Ohio first introduced a statute attempting to abolish
the Rule in Shelley's Case in 1840." Few changes," other
than changes in the number of the section and slight
changes in the wording, have occurred in the statute until
the recent amendment to Section 10504-70,"9 which went
into effect on August 21, 1941. Prior to that amendment
Section 10504-70 read as follows:
"When lands, tenements, or hereditaments are given by will to a
person for his life, and after his death to his heirs in fee, or by words
to that effect, the conveyance shall vest an estate for life only in such
first taker, and a remainder in fee simple in his heirs."
However, even a cursory examination of the statute
in that form reveals several wide gaps which enable the
Rule to descend unexpectedly from its feudal hideout to
trap the unwary and to defeat intention. For over one
hundred years the statute dealt specifically with wills alone.
On its face the statute seemed to leave deeds, personalty
and gifts to A and then to the heirs of his body untouched.
The cases supported the first " and the third "' of these im-
See n. 61, supra.
See 36 OHIO JURISPRUDENCE (1st ed. 1934), "Shelley's Case, Rule In,"
Sec. 22; also, discussion in Ohio cases on this Rule cited elsewhere in this
article.
IsIbid.
' OHIo GENERAL CODE (Page, 1938).
' Continental Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Skinner, supra, n. 55; Bates v. Wini-
frede Coal Co., 4 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 265, 15 Ohio D. 533 (1906), aff'd without
opinion in 30 W. L. Bull. 307 (1906); Akers v. Akron, etc., Ry. Co., 20 Ohio
C.C. (n.s) 352, 41 Ohio C.C. 354 (1912); Neff v. Abert, supra, n. 61; Mack
v. Champion, 11 Ohio D. 327, 26 W. L. Bull 113 (1890); Jenkins v. Artz, 7
Ohio N.P. 371, 6 Ohio D. 439 (1897); Kepler v. Reevers, supra, n. 58;
Gordon v. Bartlett, supra, n. 55; Hess v. Lakin, supra, n. 58; Davis v. Saun-
ders, supra, n. 55; Patterson v. Patterson, Dayton, 288.
One minor exception was Kirby v. Brownlee, supra, n. 58, where a trust
was created by deed for the purpose of a marriage settlement.
" Watson v. Watson, supra, n. 63.
Contra: Chaffin v. Dixon, 13 Ohio App. 1 (1920), motion to certify
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pressions. Although text writers stoutly proclaimed 72 that
the Rule did not apply to personalty in Ohio, no Ohio cases
had specifically discussed the point.73
However, this unsatisfactory condition was cleared up
greatly with the enactment of the recent amendment to
Section 10504-70, which now reads as follows:
"When lands, tenements or hereditaments are given by deed or
will to a person for his life, and after his death to his heirs in fee,...
the conveyance shall vest an estate for life only in such first taker,
,z'eruled in 1S Ohio L.R. 41 (1920); Williams v. Haller, 13 Ohio N.P.
(n.s.) 329, 27 Ohio D. 343 (1912).
'See 36 OHIo JURISPRUDENCE (1st ed. 1934), "Shelley's Case, Rule In,"
Sec. 21. See, generally, in respect to the Rule in Shelley's Case as applied
to personalty: 1 Ssmss, FuTuRE INT RESTS (1st ed. 1936), Sec. 220; Kales,
The Rile in Shelley's Case Does Not Apply to Personal Property (1910),
4 ILL. L. REv. 639.
' King v. Beck, appearing in the reports at 12 Ohio 390 (1843) and at
15 Ohio 559 (146) is the case usually cited in support of the text writers. It
does not specifically mention the applicability of the Rule in Shelley's Case to
personalty, although it does state that fees tail are possible in land only. The
will in question gave all the property owned by the testator to A, to be used
by him without reservation while he lives; at his death, to A's legal heir or
heirs, born in wedlock, and if none, to the children of B and C (the testa-
tor's sisters), in equal shares. The testator died leaving both real and personal
property. A survived the testator, and then died leaving children living. The
question arose as to whether A's administrator or A's children should take.
In its first opinion in the case, the court awarded the real property to A's
heirs of the body on the ground that the Rule in Shelley's Case gave A a
fee tail, and the Ohio statute dealing with fees tail give A's heirs of the body
an estate in fee simple upon A's death. The court awarded the personalty
to A's administrator, however, because A had full title thereto. In ruling out
the possibility of a remainder in A's heirs of the body, the court observed that
the same words of the same sentence of the same bequest, conveying property
of both classes, would not receive different meanings. Since fees tail were
not possible in Ohio in respect to personalty, however, A was given a fee
simple absolute. It is submitted that this case, if it stands for anything in
respect to the Rule, stands for the proposition that the Rule does apply to
personalty, at least where the Rule has been applied to realty passing under
identical gift.
In the second opinion in the case, the court reversed the previous decision,
giving A's children a remainder in fee in both the realty and the personalty.
Since the court interpreted the words "heirs born in wedlock" as "children,"
the children took as purchasers, and hence there was no occasion whatsoever
for an application of the Rule.
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and a remainder in fee simple in his heirs; should the remainder be
given to the heirs of the body of the life tenant, the conveyance shall
vest an estate for life only in such first taker and a remainder in fee
simple in the heirs of his body. The rule in Shelley's Case is hereby
abolished and shall not be given force or effect."7 4
It is apparent that Ohio has at last abolished the Rule
in Shelley's Case in its entirety. Each of the three difficul-
ties under the earlier statute has been removed in one way
or another. The statute now covers deeds expressly.
Where the grant is to A for life and then to the heirs of
A's body, there is no longer any doubt but that A takes a
life estate with the heirs of A's body receiving a remain-
der in fee simple."5 Moreover, any remaining uncertain-
ties in respect to the application of the Rule to personalty
would seem to be removed."0 The last sentence in the
statute is a direct statement of the legislative intention to
abolish the Rule. It is difficult to see how courts could cir-
" The words italicized have been added by the recent amendment. The
following words have been deleted where the dots (...) appear: "or by words
to that effect,".
"'There was some question before the recent amendment to Section
10504-70, as to whether the Rule would apply to remainders to the "children'
or "issue" of the life tenant.
Cases holding the Rule inapplicable to remainders to "children," irrespec-
tive of any statute on the subject: Turley v. Turley, supra, n. 65; Williams
v. Mears, 2 Disn. 604, 13 Ohio Dec. (Rep.) 369 (1859); Sheets v. Mouat,
supra, n. 24. See Akers v. Akron, etc., Ry. Co., supra, n. 70.
For dicta indicating the Rule does not operate in respect to remainders to
"issue," see: Williams v. Mears, supra (dictum in case involving "children") ;
Halley v. Hengstler, supra, n. 62 (dictum in cases involving "heirs"). See,
also, 36 OHIO JURISPRUDENCE (1st ed. 1934), "Shelley's Case, Rule In," Sec.
15. Contra: see Watson v. Watson, supra, n. 63 (dictum in case involving
"issue of her body, then living").
The recent amendment of Section 10504-70 would appear to settle the
matter.
"See Note, The Uniform Property Act (1939), 5-2 HARv. L. Rv. 993, at
999, where it is suggested that personalty is not expressly covered in most of
the statutes attempting to abolish the Rule in Shelley's Case. This seems
desirable because some courts tend to apply the Rule indiscriminately to per-
sonalty as well as realty.
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cumvent this declaration even if they so desired, which
they undoubtedly do not in view of their previous out-
cries against the Rule."' This declaration was unquestion-
ably inserted to remove all conceivable sources of ambigu-
ity, such as the application of the Rule to personalty, for
the long and checkered career of the Rule in Ohio and had
aptly demonstrated the grave need for a catchall provision
of this type.
Does Section 10504-70, as amended, limit the number
of estates available to the practitioner? Not at all. His
situation remains exactly the same as before. Whereas
the skilled practitioner could avoid the application of the
Rule, even before its abolition, by skilful draftsmanship
(i. e., by demonstrating his use of the word "heirs" in the
more limited sense), 7" the present practitioner is even less
pressed to achieve his ends. He needs merely to use long-
accustomed language, "to A and his heirs," to create a full
fee simple, for the statute applies only where remahiders
are limited to the heirs of the life tenant. Similarly, if the
desire is to give A a life estate, and, either mediately or
immediately, a remainder to A and his heirs, that also can
be done, apart from the doctrine of merger. As was the
case under the Rule itself, a preliminary problem of con-
struction " exists before a conclusion can be reached as to
the application of the statute. Thus, the statute would not
be applicable here because it deals only with remainders
"The following cases criticize the Rule as unreasonably defeating inten-
tion: McFeeley's Lessee v. M~loore's Heirs, supra, n. 55; King v. Beck,
sirpra, n. 61; Kirby v. Brownlee, supra, n. 58; Patterson v. Patterson, supra,
n. 70.
Only one case seemed to favor it. See Hess v. Lakin, supra, n. 58, where
the court believed alienability to be furthered.
" See note 63, supra.
" See In Re Youtsey, 260 Fed. 42.3 (D.C., S.D. of Ohio, 1916), for illus-
tration of court's attitude toward problem of construction after the Rule in
Shelley's Case had been abolished by statute in Ohio in respect to wills.
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to the life tenant's heirs and not with those to the life
tenant himself.
What effect will the recent amendment have on the
status of fees tail in Ohio? As noted above, a gift "to A
for life, and then to the heirs of his body," which the com-
bined operation of the Rule in Shelley's Case and the
doctrine of merger would ordinarily convert into a fee
tail in A (which would be subject to the application of
Section 10512-8), now results in a life estate in A, fol-
lowed by a remainder in fee simple in those persons who
prove to be the heirs of his body at his death. Is Section
10512-8 circumvented by that result, thereby indicating a
new trend in the treatment of fees tail in Ohio? No. The
abolition of the Rule in Shelley's Case merely allows the
words "heirs of his body" to function as words of pur-
chase in accordance with intention. Sections 8510-11
(in respect to deeds) and 10504-72 " (in respect to wills)
do the rest, for they provide that a full fee simple is created
unless an intention to create a lesser estate has been mani-
fested. However, in order to be certain that all conflict
between Sections 10504-70 and 10512-8 would be avoided,
this situation was expressly covered in the recent amend-
ment to the former section.
Does the amended statute apply if the estate granted
to the heirs is not immediate? For instance, suppose a
testator devises property to A for life, to B for life, and
then to A's heirs. Once again, the statutory mandate-
"The rule in Shelley's Case is hereby abolished and shall
not be given force or effect."8 2 will come into play. But
' OHIO GENERAL CODE (Page, 1938).
Ibid.
'Section 10504-70 of Ohio General Code (Page, 1938), as amended;
quoted n. 74, supra.
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who are the heirs under such circumstances ? Of course,
the statute is of no help here; the answer depends on or-
dinary principles of construction relating to class gifts.
Under these, the "heirs" would probably be determined as
of the date of A's death, unless the testator had mani-
fested an intention to select some other date. Of course,
strictly speaking, the word "heirs" means those persons
who inherit 's estate under the Ohio laws of descent and
distribution when A dies intestate. Although this does
not necessarily happen under the circumstances stated
above, the nearest approximation to the technical meaning
and the one probably intended by the testator would be
such persons as would stand in the relationship of heirs at
.J's death if the statute of descent were brought into opera-
tion. However, a court would undoubtedly scrutinize the
will closely for an indication that another date for the de-
termination of A's "heirs" was intended, such as the date
of the execution of the will, the death of the testator, or
the actual distribution of the estate to the "heirs." If dis-
covered, any of these intentions would be honored, thereby
closing the class on those who would be A's heirs if he were
to die intestate on the prescribed date.
Section 12 of the proposed Uniform Property Act 8
and Section 10504-70, as amended, accomplish the same
results, but do so in a slightly different manner. Section
, For a more complete treatment of this problem, see Casner, Construction
of Gifts to "Heirs" and the Like (1939) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 207.
"Section 12 reads as follows:
"Whenever any person, by conveyance, takes a life interest and in the
same conveyance an interest is limited by way of remainder, whether medi-
ately or immediately, to his heirs, or the heirs of his body, or his issue, or next
of kin, or some such heirs, heirs of the body, issue, or next of kin, the words
'heirs,' 'heirs of the body,' 'issue,' or 'next of kin,' or other words of like
import used in the conveyance, in the limitation therein by way of remainder,
are not words of limitation carrying to such person an estate in the property,
but are words of purchase creating a remainder in the designated heirs, heirs of
the body, issue, or next of kin."
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12 is more explicit in abolishing the Rule in Shelley's Case
in respect to gifts to issue or next of kin (and thus in re-
spect to personalty) and to mediate (as contrasted to im-
mediate) remainders in the heirs of the life tenant. Like
Section 10504-70, Section 12 expressly states its underly-
ing motive, i. e., to abolish the Rule in Shelley's Case, but
it does so in the title instead of the body of the Section.
The effect would no doubt be the same whatever the posi-
tion.
In conclusion, therefore, it would seem unnecessary to
enact the proposed Section 12 in Ohio at the present time
unless the rest of the Act is likewise adopted. A desire
for promoting uniformity as between states would seem
to be the sole reason for preferring Section 12 over Sec-
tion 10504-70, together with the inherent advantages re-
sulting therefrom. Ohio should learn its lesson, however,
from the many statutes which attempted to abolish the
Rule in Shelley's Case over a period of more than one hun-
dred years before achieving complete success. What could
be a more effective demonstration of the fact that piece-
meal legislation doesn't pay?
